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Abstract 
 
Using a large sample of establishments drawn from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) 
employer survey, we study gender differences in promotion rates and in the wage gains attached to 
promotions.  Several unique features of our data distinguish our analysis from the previous literature on 
this topic.  First, we have information on the wage increases attached to promotions, and relatively few 
studies on gender differences have considered promotions and wage increases together.  Second, our data 
include job-specific worker performance ratings, allowing us to control for performance and ability more 
precisely than through commonly-used skill indicators such as educational attainment or tenure.  Third, in 
addition to standard information on occupation and industry, we have data on a number of other firm 
characteristics, enabling us to control for these variables while still relying on a broad, representative 
sample, as opposed to a single firm or a similarly narrowly-defined population.  Our results indicate that 
women have lower probabilities of promotion and expected promotion than do men but that there is 
essentially no gender difference in wage growth with or without promotions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the literature on gender differences in the labor market concerns wages.  A smaller 
literature focuses on gender differences in job assignment and, specifically, promotions.  Ultimately the 
two topics are linked, since promotions are typically accompanied by increases in wages.  Although an 
understanding of gender differences in the career experiences of workers in firms requires an empirical 
analysis that accounts for both promotions and wages, relatively few studies of gender differences in 
promotions have also considered gender differences in the wage changes attached to promotion.  One 
reason that the omission of wages is problematic is that the concept of a promotion is quite broad.  An 
observation of equal promotion rates between equally-skilled and observationally similar women and men 
would be misleading if the promotions received by each group differed in quality, with men perhaps 
receiving the more desirable promotions.  We can address this issue to some extent since the wage change 
attached to a promotion provides some indication of how large a step up the hierarchy a given promotion 
is, with larger steps usually being accompanied by larger wage increases.
1   
The empirical literature on gender differences in promotions investigates whether equally 
qualified men and women with similar observable characteristics have the same chances of receiving a 
promotion or, more generally, of advancing their careers.  Studies in this literature differ in terms of the 
type of data used; some use data from one or a small number of firms or establishments (with data on 
many or all of the workers employed), and others use samples of workers (generally resulting in no more 
than one worker per establishment).   
This literature has yielded mixed results.  Some studies have found that promotion rates are lower 
for women than for men with similar observed characteristics (Cabral, Ferber, and Green, 1981; Olson 
and Becker, 1983; Cannings 1988; Spurr 1990; McCue 1996; Cobb-Clark 2001; Ransom and Oaxaca 
2005; Acosta 2005).  Others, such as Stewart and Gudykunst (1982), Gerhart and Milkovich (1989), 
Hersch and Viscusi (1996), Spilerman and Petersen (1999), and Barnett, Baron, and Stuart (2000) have 
found the reverse.  Still other studies have found no significant gender difference in promotion rates.  This 
was the finding in Lewis (1986), Hartmann (1987), Powell and Butterfield (1994), and Paulin and Mellor 
(1996).  Similarly, Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard (2005) found no gender difference in promotion rates, 
using data from a single, large, U.S. retail employer.  And, in a longitudinal study of individual educators 
in Oregon and New York, Eberts and Stone (1985) found that a gender difference favoring males in the 
early 1970s diminished and became insignificant by the late 1970s, arguing that equal opportunity 
 
1 We do not mean to suggest that job quality differences are described only by wages.  A large number of other factors, for 
example work-life balance, clearly determine the worker’s perception of the “quality” of a promotion.  Nonetheless, the extent 
of movement up the hierarchy is an important factor in assessing employers’ treatment of observationally similar men and 
women.  employment enforcement contributed to the decline.  Finally, using personnel data for managerial, 
administrative and professional occupations within a construction and engineering company, Petersen and 
Saporta (2004) found no gender differences in promotion after controlling for individual characteristics, 
though they found higher promotion rates for women in the absence of controls.  Their evidence also 
contradicts the notion of a glass ceiling for women, since promotion rates were higher for men at the low 
end of the hierarchy and higher for women towards the top of the hierarchy.
2    
While many previous studies have considered only promotion probabilities and not the wage 
increases attached to promotions, several have studied both.  Olson and Becker (1983) and McCue (1996) 
found lower promotion rates for women than for men, but comparable wage increases attached to 
promotions for the two groups.  Gerhart and Milkovich (1989) also found comparable wage increases 
attached to promotions, though in that study promotion rates were higher for women than for men.  
Hersch and Viscusi (1996) and Barnett, Baron, and Stuart (2000) found that women had higher promotion 
rates but men had higher promotion-associated wage increases.  Cobb-Clark (2001) found precisely the 
opposite pattern: men had higher promotion rates but women had higher wage increases attached to 
promotions.  Finally, using a panel of British households, Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2003) found 
that, after controlling for observed and unobserved worker heterogeneity, women are promoted at roughly 
the same rate as men but receive smaller wage increases from promotion.
3   
Given the mixed empirical results concerning gender differences in promotions and the limited 
number of studies that analyze both promotion and compensation, further work in this area remains of 
interest.  Our goal in this paper is to contribute to this literature by analyzing data on promotions and 
wages for a large sample of recently hired workers spanning many establishments.  Our data are of a 
unique type that has not been used previously in this literature.  The sample is from the Multi-City Study 
of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), a large, cross-sectional survey of employers (establishments) in four 
metropolitan areas of the United States in the mid-1990s.  Many of the survey questions pertain to the 
establishment’s most recently hired worker, including information on promotions, expected promotions, 
                                                 
2 Similar findings of lower female promotion rates at low levels of the job hierarchy but higher promotion rates higher up in the 
hierarchy are reported by Tsui and Gutek (1984), Lewis (1986), DiPrete 1989 (chapter 9), Rosenfeld (1992), and Spilerman 
and Petersen (1999). 
3 While these studies used data from the United States, others have investigated gender differences in promotion rates outside 
the United States.  As a whole, the international evidence is somewhat less favorable to women than is the evidence based on 
US data.  Studies finding lower promotion rates for women include Bamberger, Admati-Dvir, and Harel’s (1995) study of two 
Israeli high-tech companies; Pekkarinen and Vartianinen’s (2004) analysis of panel data on Finnish metalworkers; Sabatier and 
Carrere’s (2005) analysis of academic researchers in France; and Ranson and Reeves’ (1995) study of computer professionals 
in a western Canadian city.  Wright, Baxter, and Birkelund (1995) compare the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Australia, Sweden, 
Norway, and Japan, concluding that evidence of lower promotion rates for women is weaker in the U.S. than for the other 
countries.  Also relevant is Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller’s (1997) finding, based on white-collar workers from the Austrian 
Microcensus, that females have to meet higher ability standards than males to achieve promotions.   
2and wages, as well as measures of worker performance, tenure (i.e. the amount of time that has elapsed 
between the hiring and survey dates), and detailed worker and firm characteristics.   
Several features of the data are particularly appealing for an analysis of gender differences in 
promotions.  First, as mentioned, we have information not only on promotions but on the wage increases 
attached to promotions, allowing us to consider both in the same study.  Second, the data include an 
extensive set of controls for worker and firm characteristics that is paramount in an analysis of gender 
differences in promotion rates or in any other labor market outcome.  Of particular importance on the 
worker side are direct measures of productivity or job performance.  The available measures in this 
literature are rarely job-specific, and typically the best available proxy is the worker’s educational 
attainment.
4  While we control for education and other worker characteristics, we can also control for 
performance more completely using numerical job-specific ratings reflecting supervisors’ appraisals of 
worker performance, as well as the same supervisors’ rating of the performance of “typical workers” in 
the same job into which the establishment’s most recent worker was hired.  This offers an unusual 
opportunity to control for job-specific worker performance in both an absolute and relative sense.  The 
data sets used in studies in the promotions literature based on broad, representative samples such as ours 
lack information on worker performance ratings.
5   
A potential deficiency of the performance ratings, however, is that they might be biased in a way 
that is correlated with gender.  As noted in Blau, Ferber, and Winkler (2006, p. 179), it has been found 
that identical papers were given higher ratings by students who believed the authors were male instead of 
female, and similar findings were reported in studies that asked raters to consider the qualifications of 
applicants for employment.
6  Bartol (1999) reviews several field and experimental studies of gender bias 
in performance appraisals, concluding that findings are contradictory, with some studies finding a bias 
and others finding no bias.  Later in the paper we present some evidence that the gender of the immediate 
supervisor has no effect on the most recently hired worker’s performance rating in the starting job.  While 
this does not prove that the ratings in our data our unbiased, it does at least cast doubt on certain types of 
gender-related bias.  Further, if there is a bias against women in the performance appraisals, this would 
serve to lower our estimate of the “unexplained” gender gap in performance—yielding a conservative 
estimate of this difference (at least with respect to this factor).  
                                                 
4 In addition to educational attainment, Cobb-Clark (2001) controls for AFQT scores in her analysis using the NLSY, though as 
an overall measure of ability the AFQT score is less directly informative than is a job-specific performance rating. 
5 The performance ratings in this survey have been exploited previously in Neumark (1999) in an analysis of gender and racial 
differentials in starting wages, though that study did not consider promotions or the wage growth arising from promotions.  
Neumark finds some evidence consistent with employers having worse information about new female than new male 
employees that may partly explain the lower starting wages paid to women, though he notes that the evidence is not strong 
from the standpoint of statistical significance. 
6 Further information on gender bias in performance ratings can be found in the studies reviewed in Valian (1998) and in 
Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritzke (1999). 
3In addition to the worker performance ratings, a further advantage of the MCSUI for our analysis 
is that it contains a number of firm characteristics that were unavailable for use as controls in earlier 
promotion studies.  For example, the survey includes an indicator for nonprofit status.  Our data show that 
women are more heavily represented in the nonprofit than in the for-profit sector; the fraction working in 
the for-profit sector is 74 percent for women versus 87 percent for men.  Recent empirical work by 
DeVaro and Samuelson (2005) documents a pronounced difference in promotion rates between for-profit 
and nonprofit organizations, with promotions less likely in nonprofits.  These considerations suggest that 
nonprofit status should be controlled in analyses of gender differences in promotion rates.  To our 
knowledge, no prior studies of promotions have had access to data that would allow nonprofit status to be 
controlled.  In addition to nonprofit status, we control for industry, establishment size, number of sites of 
operation, whether or not the firm is a franchise, and the percentage of workers covered by collective 
bargaining agreements.   
The contribution of an analysis using these data may be illustrated by considering some 
contrasting studies.  McCue (1996) analyzes promotions using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), and Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2003) use the British Household Panel Survey.  While both 
data sets are nationally-representative panels with detailed worker characteristics, they are thin on firm 
characteristics.
7  Furthermore, neither of these data sets contains job-specific measures of worker 
performance.  In contrast, case studies of single firms or small numbers of firms are able to control for 
firm and job characteristics very precisely, but only by restricting the analysis to one or a small number of 
firms from which it may be difficult to draw general inferences (e.g. Ransom and Oaxaca 2005 and 
Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard 2005).  Like the studies using broader samples, these single-firm analyses 
lack individual performance ratings.  Our data represent a middle ground that we see as a useful 
complement to this literature, particularly given the unique presence of worker performance ratings.  We 
work with a broad, representative sample (though representative of the population of establishments in 
four major U.S. metropolitan areas rather than a nationally representative sample of workers).  At the 
same time, we are able to control for firm characteristics more precisely than is usually possible with such 
a broad sample, though inevitably not as precisely as in case studies.   
Competing explanations for gender differences in promotion rates may be classified into two 
broad categories: those that are based on productivity or female preferences for different types of jobs and 
those that are based on discrimination or broader structural factors.  The productivity/preference-based 
explanations suggest that outcomes (such as promotion rates) may be less favorable for women than men 
                                                 
7 Using data on white men and women from the NLSY, Cobb-Clark (2001) controlled for a limited set of firm characteristics 
(dummies for two firm-size groups, whether the worker is covered by a collective bargaining agreement, whether the employer 
has multiple locations, and whether the firm is in the public sector).   
4due to gender differences in productivity or in job-related preferences (e.g., for authority or demanding 
positions).  Productivity differences could arise due to gender differences in schooling and other pre-
market training as well as labor force attachment.  Job-related preferences may be influenced by 
socialization, among other factors.  Gender differences in productivity or job preferences could also arise 
from the division of labor in the family.  For example, Becker (1985) argues that since housework is more 
effort-intensive than other household activities such as leisure, and since women have historically 
performed a greater share of housework than men, married women spend less energy on each hour of 
market work than men working the same number of hours.  This yields lower market wages for women 
and also induces women to economize on energy expended on market work by seeking less demanding 
jobs.  If this explanation is correct, the presence of job-specific performance ratings offers us a unique 
opportunity to address productivity-related explanations for gender differences in promotion rates.   
Theories of gender discrimination based on personal tastes could take the form of prejudice on the 
part of employers, customers, or co-workers (Becker 1957).  In the case of employer-based prejudice, this 
would imply that supervisors prefer to manage males rather than females.  To the extent that this 
preference is stronger for higher-level positions, gender differences in promotion could result.  For 
example, it could be that many managers prefer women in low-level jobs, but not managerial ones (Eagly 
and Karau 2002). 
Theories of statistical discrimination, following early work by Phelps (1972) and Arrow (1973), 
could also yield gender differences in promotions or wage growth even in the absence of personal 
prejudice.  In such models, employers facing imperfect information about worker productivity rely on 
certain group characteristics (such as gender) as signals of individual productivity.  Lazear and Rosen 
(1990) offer one such story that gives rise to gender discrimination in promotions.  In their model, the 
employer rationally discriminates against women because gender is correlated with some unobserved 
factor (such as one’s productivity in nonmarket work, which is assumed to be higher for women than for 
men) that is relevant to promotions and thereby serves as a signal to the employer.   
Either the productivity/preferences or discrimination explanations could lead to promotion 
differences that are associated with differences in the types of jobs men and women hold.  As we have 
seen, Becker (1985) provides a rationale for women to prefer less demanding jobs.  And, models of 
statistical discrimination suggest that employers may prefer not to hire women for jobs which typically 
have long promotion ladders.
8  Thus, we explicitly investigate the extent to which differences in 
                                                 
8 There is evidence from the sociology literature that longer job ladders tend to be found in jobs and firms that are 
predominantly male (Petersen and Saporta, 2004, p. 877), and that the step sizes between levels of the promotional hierarchy 
are larger for jobs that are predominantly male, implying that promotions yield greater advancement for men than women 
(Barnett, Baron, and Stuart, 2000). 
5occupation can explain the residual gender gap in promotion rates.  As is well known, the distribution of 
employment across occupations is quite different for women versus men.  If women are more heavily 
concentrated in occupations with lower promotion rates, this could potentially account for the gender 
difference in promotions.  It is also possible that gender differences in firm characteristics are important 
for understanding promotion differences.  While previous analyses have explored the role of occupation, 
our data contain information on firm characteristics that have not been available in earlier studies, so it is 
interesting to see the incremental value of these firm characteristics in explaining the gender gap in 
promotions.  As noted above, one possibility is that women are more heavily represented in the nonprofit 
sector where promotion rates tend to be lower.   
While it is not possible to ascertain whether gender differences in occupation distributions and 
firm characteristics are due to personal preferences, discrimination, or a combination of the two, it is still 
of interest to learn the extent to which they constitute the mechanism generating observed gender 
differences in promotion rates.  Further, the sociology literature emphasizes the importance of sex 
segregation as a causal mechanism that induces other gender differences in careers (Reskin and Bielby 
2005).  As noted in Reskin and Bielby (pp. 71-72), “By concentrating men and women in different jobs, 
segregation exposes them to more or less similar employment practices and reward systems that can, in 
turn, exacerbate or moderate sex differences in other work outcomes.”  More generally, sociologists point 
out that “structural roles in which individuals find themselves affect their tastes, outlooks, power, social 
networks, and group loyalties in ways that could not have been anticipated in advance.” (England and 
Farkas, 1994, p. 345).  To some extent then the occupation and industry variables may capture some of 
these effects.  Moreover, it is likely that the unexplained component of the gender gap in our promotion 
models reflects the impact of such structural factors as well as the impact of discrimination and other 
unmeasured factors.  An unexplained component of the gender promotion gap, even in models such as 
ours that control for reported job-specific worker productivity, is consistent with Granovetter’s (1994, p. 
207) observation that, “Even if productivity were easily gauged, promotions often result from motives or 
causes not clearly related to it, but easily understandable when relevant social structures and motives are 
analyzed.”  
A potential limitation of our analysis, as with most other analyses of promotions, is that the 
empirical definition of a promotion is broad, so that a promotion might mean something different for men 
than for women.  The data are not sufficiently rich to rule out this possibility.  While we can observe the 
wage differences arising from promotions, it might be that promotions differ in some other respect (such 
as prestige) than the compensation attached to jobs.  Another limitation is that our analysis is restricted to 
one worker per establishment, in particular the most recently hired worker.  Ideal data would contain 
6multiple workers per establishment with longer average job tenures than experienced by our sample of 
recent hires.  Furthermore, while we can control for worker characteristics and occupation, we do not 
observe the hierarchy of jobs in these establishments.  For each establishment we observe only a “slice” of 
the hierarchy, namely the position into which a worker was hired and the position into which s/he has 
been or could potentially be promoted.   
II. DATA: MULTI-CITY STUDY OF URBAN INEQUALITY 
We use data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), a cross-sectional employer 
telephone survey collected between 1992 and 1995.  There are 3510 establishments in the data, and the 
sampling universe consists of four metropolitan areas:  Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles.  The 
survey respondent was the owner in 14.5% of the cases, the manager or supervisor in 42%, a personnel 
department official in 31.5%, and someone else in 12%.  Screening identified a respondent who actually 
carried out hiring for the relevant position, and the survey instrument took 30-45 minutes to administer on 
the telephone, with an overall response rate of 67%.  For more information about the data, see Holzer 
(1996).  Our analysis is based on the entire sample, except for seventeen cases we delete in agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing. 
Data were collected in two subsamples and then merged to produce the final release.  The first 
subsample, covering slightly less than two thirds of the cases, was drawn from regional employment 
directories provided by Survey Sampling, Inc. based on local telephone directories.  This subsample 
(called the SSI sample) was stratified by establishment size (25% 1-19 employees, 50% 20-99 employees, 
25% 100 or more employees) and was designed to be self-weighting.  It was restricted to employers who 
had hired a worker within the previous three years for a position that did not require a college degree.  
The second subsample was drawn from the current or most recent employer reported by respondents in 
the companion MCSUI household survey, which over-sampled low-income areas and areas with high 
concentrations of racial minorities.  This subsample is not restricted to jobs not requiring a college degree.  
Sampling weights adjust for all of these considerations, and we use these weights throughout our study.
9   
A substantial fraction of survey questions asks about the most recently hired worker, and these 
questions form the basis for the empirical analysis.  The survey asks whether the most recently hired 
worker has been promoted by the survey date, and the employer’s response to this question is the main 
dependent variable in the first part of our analysis.  We also present results using a measure of expected 
                                                 
9 As stated in the codebook, “[the weights] make use of the link to the MCSUI household file, for those firms that were 
sampled in this manner, thereby taking account of the household sampling structure and response rates.  They also adjust for 
the fact that the Boston and LA firm samples were incomplete, and the fact that the SSI sample deliberately omits jobs that 
require college degrees … When the observations in the employer database are weighted by this variable the result should be a 
representative sample of firms, such as would occur if a random sample of employed people were drawn from each city.” (See 
Holzer et al. (1998), p. 98.)  
7promotion as the dependent variable, in particular the employer’s answer to whether or not the most 
recently hired worker is expected to be promoted within the next five years (regardless of whether a 
promotion was received by the survey date).  The MCSUI data also contain a number of variables 
measuring wages and the wage growth attached to promotions.  Four variables pertain to the wages of the 
most recently hired worker:  starting wage, current wage at the time of the survey, wage the employee is 
expected to receive if promoted, and highest wage an employee in this position (the one into which the 
most recent worker was hired) could attain without a promotion.
10  The reported time frames for these 
wage questions were either hourly, weekly, monthly, or annually, and we converted all responses to 
hourly wages measured in 1990 dollars, deflated using the CPI-UX.  The second part of our analysis uses 
three dependent variables that we construct from these four wage questions, as explained in the next 
section. 
 
III. METHODS 
  Our analysis consists of two main parts.  In the first part, we estimate probit models for the 
probability of promotion.  In addition, we report results for the probability of expected promotion, though 
we consider the results regarding received promotions to be of greater interest since they reflect actual, 
observed outcomes as opposed to subjective expectations about the future.  Our goal here is to analyze the 
extent to which a) reported productivity and b) observable characteristics (i.e. occupation and type of 
firm) account for any observed gender difference in promotions, when controlling for other measured 
worker characteristics.  We thus report how the gender effect in models of promotion probability changes 
across a variety of specifications.  We begin with a baseline specification that includes as explanatory 
variables only sex, race, age and age squared, tenure and tenure squared, and educational attainment.  We 
then consider four extensions of the baseline: a) adding only job-specific worker performance ratings, b) 
adding performance ratings and occupation controls, c) adding performance ratings and firm 
characteristics (including industry controls), d) adding performance ratings, occupation controls and firm 
characteristics.  The second part of our analysis concerns wage growth since entering the establishment 
(focusing on the impact of promotion), potential within-job wage growth in the absence of a promotion, 
and the expected wage growth attached to expected promotions.  Finally, we test one possible source of 
gender discrimination in promotions by using information on the gender of the most recently hired 
worker’s immediate supervisor.  We explain our methods in more detail in the following subsections. 
                                                 
10 The questions are as follows: “What is the actual starting wage/salary?”; “What is his/her current wage/salary?”; “What is 
the highest wage or salary that any employee in this position could expect to be paid without promotion?”; “If promoted, what 
would this employee’s wage or salary be?” 
8We acknowledge that some of the variables we use as controls in our analyses might be considered 
endogenous, and in particular might be affected by differences in employers’ treatment of equally 
qualified men and women.  We have already considered this issue for the performance appraisal variables.  
Another example would be tenure, the amount of time that has elapsed between the hiring date and the 
survey date, which could reflect gender differences in involuntary terminations, ceteris paribus, or be 
influenced by worker responses to perceived differences in treatment at the firm.  Also, gender differences 
in occupations or firm types could be due in part to gender discrimination.  As noted above, to the extent 
such variables are influenced by labor market discrimination, controlling for them could downward bias 
our estimate of discrimination—the unexplained gender gap in promotions.  At the same time the 
unexplained gap may in part be due to the impact of unmeasured characteristics related to the productivity 
or preferences of men and women; an example would be differences between men and women in their 
preferences for various types of work or for degrees of authority within an organization.  In this case, our 
estimate of discrimination could be biased upward.  These considerations suggest caution in interpreting 
the unexplained gender gap in promotion as an estimate of discrimination.   
 
3.1 Probability of Promotion  
We estimate probit models for the probabilities of promotion (and expected promotion), focusing 
on how the gender coefficient changes across specifications that include various combinations of the 
following control variables: age (and age squared), race, tenure (and tenure squared), educational 
attainment, job-specific performance ratings, occupation and industry controls, establishment size, 
number of sites of operation, for-profit status, percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining 
agreement, and whether establishment is a franchise.  These variables are defined in Table 1.
11  
Specification 1 includes only the baseline controls (age, age squared, tenure, tenure squared, race, 
and educational attainment).  As we shall see in the next section, a statistically significant gender gap in 
promotion rates (favoring men) is found in the baseline model and also unconditionally.  A potential 
explanation for the lower promotion rate of women is that the gender difference reflects productivity 
differences between men and women.  While the baseline specification includes the productivity-proxies 
like education and tenure generally used in analyses of this kind, an attractive and unique feature of the 
MCSUI is that it includes job-specific worker performance ratings.  Specification 2 adds these 
performance ratings to the baseline controls from Specification 1.  We then address “location-based” 
                                                 
11 One relevant variable that is not contained in the MCSUI is the worker’s employment experience prior to entering the firm.  
While we do not observe this variable, we do control for tenure with the firm.  More importantly, we control for the worker’s 
job-specific performance in addition to educational attainment.  Since prior work experience would be included in a promotion 
equation mainly to capture a worker’s skills and ability, it might be argued that it is unnecessary when a direct measure of pre-
promotion performance is available. 
9explanations for gender differences in promotions.  To more precisely identify the role of gender 
differences in employment by occupation versus firm, in Specification 3 we first add only occupation 
controls along with performance ratings to the baseline model; in Specification 4 we then add only firm 
characteristics to the baseline and (reported) worker productivity controls.  Finally, in Specification 5 we 
include baseline controls, performance ratings, occupation controls and firm characteristics.  
As noted above, we also repeat the analyses described above using “expected promotion” as a 
dependent variable.  We are inclined to put less weight on these results since they relate to expectations 
regarding promotion, which may or may not be realized.  However, they do provide interesting 
supplementary information, especially in light of the focus in the data set on recently hired workers.   
 
3.2 Analysis of Wages  
We consider three dependent variables pertaining to wages, derived from the four wage variables 
described in the previous section: wage growth since entering the firm; within-job wage growth attainable 
in the starting position without a promotion; and expected wage growth attached to expected promotion.  
We estimate OLS regressions for each of our three dependent variables, using the entire set of controls.  
Our wage dependent variables are defined as follows:   
 
1.  wage growth since entering the firm ≡ ln(current wage) – ln(starting wage) 
2.  within-job wage growth attainable in the starting position without a promotion ≡ ln(highest wage 
attainable in starting position without a promotion) – ln(starting wage) 
3.  expected wage growth attached to expected promotion ≡ ln(expected wage the worker will receive 
if promoted from the starting position) – ln(current wage) 
 
In the regression for the first of these dependent variables, of principal interest is the coefficient on 
the dummy variable indicating whether the worker has already received a promotion by the survey date.  
This parameter provides information about the average additional wage growth associated with having 
been promoted as compared with not having been promoted.  A potential problem with this interpretation 
is that, obviously, individuals who have been promoted may differ from those with similar measured 
characteristics who have not been promoted.  If they are, for example, a positively selected group, they 
may have earned more than otherwise similar individual even if they had not received a promotion.  
Unfortunately, we lack a variable that could identify a simultaneous model of promotions and wage 
determination.  While we acknowledge that it may not be possible to give a causal interpretation to the 
coefficient on a promotion indicator in an OLS wage regression, the estimated return to promotion does 
10yield interesting descriptive information, which is at least suggestive of the extent of gender differences in 
returns to promotion.
12  
The second of these dependent variables, potential within-job wage growth, is interesting because 
the consequences of not getting promoted may differ between men and women.  For example, one 
possibility is that higher promotion rates for men are counterbalanced by higher rates of anticipated 
within-job wage growth for women.  It is therefore important to consider expected wage growth in the 
absence of promotions in addition to the wage growth attached to received and expected promotions.  The 
wording of the question pertaining to the “highest wage attainable without a promotion” refers to “any 
employee in this position” rather than to the specific individual.  On the one hand, a positive feature of 
this wording is that this information is available for all workers, whether or not they have been promoted.  
On the other hand, a potential measurement problem is that it is not necessarily the case that the focal 
worker (i.e., the most recent hire) would have achieved the indicated wage.  So, for example, suppose the 
most recent hire is female and that the establishment engages in wage discrimination against women.  The 
highest wage that this worker could receive in her starting position is unobserved in the data, and the 
answer the respondent reports as the highest wage attainable in that position could pertain to the 
maximum a male could expect to receive in the same position.  In light of this issue, the results based on 
this dependent variable should be interpreted cautiously.  If it is true that the “highest wage attainable” in 
the position is more likely to be defined by what a male could attain than by what a female could attain, 
this would cause us to underestimate gender differences in compensation. 
We define the third dependent variable, expected wage increase attached to expected promotion, 
only for those workers for whom a promotion is expected, estimating the model only for these workers.
13 
For this regression, we also report a specification that includes the promotion dummy on the right-hand-
side as a control. 
A theoretical model based on “sticky floors” was proposed in recent work by Booth, Francesconi, 
and Frank (2003).  The term “sticky floors” refers to the situation in which women are promoted as often 
as men but receive lower wage gains attached to promotion.  In firms with formal wage scales, women 
remain stuck to the lower wage levels on the wage scale of their new, higher job grade following 
                                                 
12 Another issue is that the data do not indicate how many promotions the worker has received since being hired.  So if some 
workers have been promoted more than once since the starting date, the estimated promotion effect will overestimate the 
average wage increase associated with a single promotion.  However, since the sample is one of recent hires, only nine percent 
of whom have been promoted by the survey date, we think this is unlikely to be a serious problem; few of these workers will 
have had time to be promoted more than once since the hiring date. 
13 If we also include those workers for which a future promotion was not expected but an actual promotion had already been 
received -- defining the “wage change attached to promotion” as the log-difference between the current (post-promotion) wage 
and the starting (pre-promotion) wage – we add only 8 observations to the male regression and 9 observations to the female 
regression, and the results are virtually unchanged. 
 
11promotion.  This can arise either due to women’s inferior market alternatives or to less favorable 
responses on the part of their employer to bids for their services from outside employers.  The authors 
find evidence consistent with their model’s main predictions, using panel data spanning the years 1991-
1995 from the British Household Panel Survey.  Since we also address wage increases attached to 
promotion in our study, we will also evaluate the “sticky floors” hypothesis on our sample of promotion 
decisions for recent hires in establishments in four American metropolitan areas. 
 
3.3 Gender Discrimination Arising from Employer Prejudice 
In both the promotion analysis and the wage analysis, the set of control variables is extensive and 
includes job-specific performance ratings to capture (reported) worker productivity in a more detailed 
way than is possible with the usual controls for educational attainment.  This raises the question of how 
gender differences in promotions or wage growth should be interpreted.  One conventional interpretation 
is that the residual gender gap is due to discrimination.  However, as noted above, in this as in other 
similar analyses, such differences in promotions (or wage growth) could reflect unobserved differences 
between men and women that are correlated with promotions.  While our data do not allow us to 
decompose the unexplained promotion difference into the part due to discrimination and the part due to 
unobserved heterogeneity, some indirect evidence allows us to speculate about the nature of the gender 
discrimination that might be present in promotion decisions.   
The MCSUI data contain information allowing us to investigate the possibility of gender 
discrimination based on personal prejudice on the part of the employer.  We observe the gender of the 
most recently hired worker’s immediate supervisor, who likely exerts strong influence on this worker’s 
promotion prospects if not determining them entirely.  We define the following dummy variable: 
   
Male Supervisor:  dummy equaling one if the most recently hired worker’s immediate supervisor 
                              in the starting job is male, and zero otherwise 
 
We include this variable and its interaction with the Male dummy variable in the probit models for 
promotion and expected promotion.  Taste-based discrimination against women (such that male 
supervisors tend to underpromote women relative to men) would imply a negative coefficient on Male 
Supervisor, and a positive coefficient on (Male × Male Supervisor).
14  In our wage models (which are 
                                                 
14 Note that the key expectation would be a positive coefficient on (Male × Male Supervisor) since the main effect of Male 
Supervisor could be influenced by the propensity of male versus female supervisors to promote in general.  So for example, if 
male supervisors tend to be present in work settings where positions have longer job ladders associated with them, both males 
12estimated separately for men and women) we include the Male Supervisor dummy as a control and report 
its coefficient.  Widespread discrimination based on personal prejudice on the part of the employer should 
imply a negative and statistically significant coefficient when this dummy is included in the equations for 
women.
15   
Of course, the foregoing assumes that female supervisors do not discriminate against their female 
subordinates in promotion decisions and wage decisions.  A theory that is at odds with this assumption is 
the “queen bee syndrome”, as defined by Staines, Tavris, and Jayaratne (1973).  According to this 
syndrome, women who are individually successful in male-dominated environments and attain positions 
of high status are more likely to endorse gender stereotypes.  That is, they tend to view the women they 
supervise as competitors and possess negative attitudes towards them, making them more likely to 
discriminate against these female subordinates.  However, the empirical analysis in (Terborg et al. 1977) 
suggests that women with higher education levels hold the most favorable attitudes toward female 
managers.  If one’s level in a promotional hierarchy is an increasing function of education, then these 
results are in conflict with the queen bee syndrome.  From the perspective of our analysis, if females as 
well as males discriminate against females, then women’s adverse promotion or wage outcomes may not 
be associated with supervisor gender, but this finding would not necessarily imply that there was no 
employer discrimination against women.  Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that this exercise is only 
pertinent to taste-based theories of discrimination in which the prejudicial views are held by the employer, 
and not to prejudice by customers or co-workers or due to statistical discrimination.   
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Summary statistics for all variables in our analysis are displayed in Table 2 for the subsamples of 
males and females.  The fraction of males in the sample is 48 percent.  This is significantly lower than the 
fraction of males in the working population.  But recall that the survey is a random sample of recent hires 
(one per establishment), not a random sample of workers.  Given this sampling scheme, if we consider the 
gender of the most recently hired worker it is not surprising that this worker is roughly equally likely to be 
a male as a female.  The fact that the fraction of female workers is higher in our sample than in the 
working population does not present problems for our analysis, since our goal in this paper is to compare 
differences in employer behavior towards women and men in a sample of new hires spanning many 
establishments. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
and females might have higher promotion rates when they have a male supervisor.  However, in the presence of gender 
discrimination, the interaction of male and male supervisor is expected to be positive.   
15 We again note that, considering the preceding footnote, the stronger prediction would be that the coefficient on male 
supervisor be larger in the male than in the female equations. 
13The first row of Table 2 reveals that, unconditionally, promotion rates are higher for men than for 
women.  The fraction of received promotions is relatively small for both sexes (10.6 percent for men and 
7.6 percent for women) because in a sample of recent hires most workers will not have been with the firm 
long enough to have received a promotion.  Nonetheless, the gender difference of 3.0 percentage points is 
large in relative magnitude (39.5 percent) and statistically significant.  As seen in the second row, rates of 
expected promotion are also higher for men than for women, and the fraction of expected promotions is 
relatively high for both sexes (68.8 percent for men and 63.1 percent for women); recall that the relevant 
question concerns the expectation of promotion within the relatively long window of the “next five 
years.”  And, the gender difference of 5.7 percentage points, while also statistically significant, is smaller 
in relative magnitude (9.0 percent).  With respect to wage growth since starting the job, potential for 
within-job wage growth in the absence of promotion, and the expected wage growth attached to expected 
promotions, the means are slightly higher for men, but the differences are not statistically significant.
16
The male and female subsamples are similar in average age and tenure with the firm.  Men are 
more likely to have less than a high school degree and women are more likely to have some college; the 
fraction with a college degree or more is similar for men and women.  With regard to race and ethnicity, 
the female workers are more likely than the males to be white and less likely to be Hispanic or “other 
nonwhite”.  The average performance of the most recently hired worker in the starting position is 
somewhat higher for women than for men, as is the average performance of the typical worker in that 
position.  A potential explanation for the latter result is that establishments for which the most recent hire 
is female may be more likely to hire women, so that the “typical worker” in the relevant position is likely 
also to be female.  As suggested in our sample and noted earlier in Neumark (1999), females appear to 
have higher job performance on average than do males.  
Focusing on the gender differences in means that are statistically significant, men are more highly 
represented than women in the following occupational groups: “Scientists, Engineers, Doctors, and 
Lawyers” (by 6 percentage points), “Craft, Construction, and Transportation” (by 16 percentage points), 
“Production Workers and Laborers” (by 11.5 percentage points), and women are more highly represented 
than men in “Teachers, Librarians, Counselors” (by 8 percentage points) and in “Administrative Support 
Occupations, Including Clerical” (by 26 percentage points).  Across industries, men are more highly 
represented in mining and construction (by 2 percentage points) and manufacturing (by 13 percentage 
points), while women are more highly represented in finance (by 5 percentage points) and services (by 19 
                                                 
16 Wage levels, as opposed to wage growth, are higher for men than for women.  The average hourly starting wage was $9.87 
for men in our main estimation sample and $9.31 for women, though the difference is statistically insignificant (t = 0.82).  The 
average hourly current wage (as of the survey date) was $10.42 for men and $9.56 for women, with the difference in means 
statistically significant only at the 10 percent level on a one-tailed test (t = 1.31).  All wages are deflated to 1990 dollars using 
the CPI-UX. 
14percentage points).  The only other firm characteristic with a noteworthy gender difference is for-profit 
status (86.9% for men and 73.7% for women).   
 
4.1 Probability of Promotion 
We next ask whether the gender difference in promotion rates observed in the first row of Table 2 
persists after controlling for worker and firm characteristics, as well as how it changes across different 
specifications of control variables.  As seen in our baseline specification of the promotion probit (Column 
1 of Table 3), the difference in the predicted probability of promotion between men and women 
(evaluating the other covariates at their means) is 2.8 percentage points, virtually the same as the 
unconditional gender difference in promotion rates in the first row of Table 2.
17  As seen in Column 2 of 
Table 3, in the presence of controls for job-specific worker performance ratings the gender effect actually 
increases slightly to 3.1 percentage points, remaining significant at the five percent level.  This result casts 
some doubt on the hypothesis that women’s lower promotion rates in the baseline model is due to lower 
reported female productivity.     
Another potential explanation for the gender difference in promotions is differences in the types of 
jobs held by women versus men.  If women are more heavily concentrated in occupations with lower 
promotion rates, this could potentially account for the gender differences in promotions.  In this event, 
adding controls for occupation would reduce the magnitude of the gender effect.  As seen in Column 3, 
the gender effect decreases only modestly to 2.5 percentage points and remains statistically significant at 
the ten percent level.  A hypothesis test that the coefficient of Male is the same between columns 2 and 3 
cannot be rejected (t = 0.71).    
It is also possible that the gender differences pertain to firm characteristics; we have particularly 
noted for-profit status as a potentially important gender difference in employment by firm.  Comparing 
columns 2 and 4, we see that the gender effect decreases to 2.5 percentage points in the presence of for-
profit status and other firm characteristics, and it remains significant at the five percent level.  However, a 
hypothesis test that the coefficient of Male is the same between columns 2 and 4 cannot be rejected (t = 
0.71).  Finally, if both occupation controls and firm characteristics are included, a comparison of columns 
2 and 5 reveals that the gender effect decreases to 2.2 percentage points, achieving significance at the ten 
percent level.  However, a test of the hypothesis that the Male coefficient is the same between columns 2 
                                                 
17 As in the recent papers by Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2003) and Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard (2005), our analysis 
pools men and women in a single equation.  We have also considered separate promotion equations for men and women, and 
these results are available upon request.  The gender effects of interest that are found by estimating separate promotion models 
for men and women are qualitatively similar to those we present here.    
15and 5 cannot be rejected (t = 0.87).  In summary, neither the job-specific performance ratings nor the 
occupation controls and firm characteristics change the estimated gender gap in promotions very much.  
We also repeated the analysis using “expected promotion” as a dependent variable, though we 
note that employer views on expected promotion may reflect expectations about differentials in quits and 
family leave by sex, particularly in this relatively young sample of recent hires.  Results for probability of 
expected promotion are displayed in Table 4.  Panel A of Table 4 reports results from models that include 
the same configurations of explanatory variables as in Table 3.  Panel B is the same, except that it also 
includes a control for whether the most recent hire had already been promoted by the survey date, since 
whether or not a future promotion is anticipated may plausibly be affected by whether or not one has 
already been received.  We note, however, that if the gender difference in promotions received as of the 
survey date reflects discrimination, this is held constant in our model of expected promotion that includes 
received promotions as a control.  In any case, the pattern of results in both panels of Table 4 is similar.  
The probability of expected promotion is roughly four to five percentage points higher for males than for 
females, in both the baseline specification and the specification that adds worker performance ratings.  In 
Panel A, these results are statistically significant at the ten percent level, and that is also the case in Panel 
B if a one-tailed test is used as the criterion for significance.  While the absolute gender difference is 
larger than was the case for actual promotions, the ceteris paribus gender difference is considerably 
smaller relative to the mean.  Moreover, unlike our results for actual promotion, in both panels the 
inclusion of either occupation controls or firm characteristics shrinks the gender gap in expected 
promotions and renders it statistically insignificant.  Thus, there seems to be more support for location-
based explanations for the gender gap in expected promotions than there was in Table 3 for received 
promotions.
18   
  Across all specifications in Table 4 the coefficient on the received promotion dummy was 
positive, statistically significant, and large in magnitude.  Other things equal, workers who have already 
received a promotion by the survey date are more likely (by more than 25 percentage points) to have a 
promotion expected within the next five years.  One potential explanation for this is unmeasured worker 
characteristics such as ability.  We think this explanation is unlikely, however, since the magnitude of the 
effect remains virtually unchanged when worker performance ratings are added to the baseline 
specification.  If unobserved worker ability is the driving force, and if the job-specific performance 
ratings at least partially capture worker ability (which seems a reasonable assumption), then the 
magnitude of the coefficient on received promotion should clearly decrease when performance controls 
                                                 
18 As in our analysis of received promotions, we also considered separate equations for men and women in the analysis of 
expected promotions.  Our results on the gender effect of interest were qualitatively similar to those we report here.  
16are added to the model.  An alternative explanation for the finding is that there are unobserved firm and 
job characteristics, such as detailed industry and occupation, that are correlated with promotions.  This 
too, however, seems unlikely.  If the promotion coefficient is picking up unobserved detailed industry and 
occupation variables, then the magnitude of the promotion coefficient should change when our (coarser) 
occupation and industry controls are included in the specification, since the detailed categories are likely 
correlated with their coarser aggregates.  In fact, the promotion coefficient is relatively insensitive to the 
inclusion of occupation controls or firm characteristics.  Another potential explanation is the commonly-
observed workplace practice of offering promotion “fast tracks.”  Fast tracks in promotions mean that 
workers who have been promoted quickly in the past are likely to be promoted quickly again in the future, 
even controlling for performance.  A number of theoretical models yield this prediction (Bernhardt 1995; 
Prendergast 1992; Meyer 1991).
19   
 
4.2 Analysis of Wages  
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 display regression results for the dependent variable “wage growth 
since entering the establishment.”
20  Of principal interest is the coefficient on the promotion dummy 
variable which suggests that, for both women and men, promotions are associated with average wage 
increases of about seven to eight percent over the starting wage.  The Oaxaca (1973) decompositions in 
the last row of the table indicate that, regardless of whether the male or female weights are used, there is 
                                                 
19 Another interpretation of the positive coefficient on received promotions is that some establishments are experiencing and 
expecting growth, so promotion rates will be higher in the past and future.  To address this, following DeVaro and Samuelson 
(2005) we construct a measure of the monthly net change in employment for each establishment.  The survey asks the 
respondent employer what the net change in the establishment’s total number of employees has been since the start of 1992 (or 
1993 for a small subset of observations collected by Kirschenman, Moss, and Tilly (KMT) towards the end of the data 
collection effort).  Using the interview dates (which range from 6/8/1992 to 3/15/1995), for each observation we compute a 
variable called “months” measuring the number of months that elapsed between the start of 1992 (or 1993 for the KMT 
observations) and the survey date, using the day of the month to compute fractional months.  Since no interview dates were 
recorded for the KMT observations, for these we set the survey dates to 3/15/1995, the midpoint of the data collection period 
for these observations.  We then define a monthly net change measure as follows: 
 
Net change = (net change since start of 1992) / (establishment size × months) 
 
When this variable is included as a control to the specifications in Table 4, Panel B, the coefficient on received promotions 
remains positive and statistically significant in all cases and roughly the same in magnitude.  This suggests that the positive 
relationship between received and expected promotions reflects more than just differences in monthly employment growth 
rates across establishments. 
 
20 The subsamples in this table are smaller than in the promotion analysis of Table 3, due to missing values in the wage 
variables.  Since the primary goal in this paper is to study gender differences in promotion rates, our preferred set of estimates 
for promotion probabilities are those reported in Table 3 that use all available observations. However, we also checked to see 
how our main results would change when the models for promotions were estimated on the smaller subsample from the wage 
analysis.  Results are in Appendix Table A2 (descriptive statistics for this smaller subsample are also reported in Appendix 
Table A1).  Given the reduction in the sample size, the gender effects in Table A2 are estimated with lower precision than in 
Table 3 and sometimes fail to achieve statistical significance at conventional levels.  Nonetheless, the Z-statistics always 
exceed one.  Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect ranges from 2.0 to 2.6 percentage points, which closely matches what we 
found in Table 3. 
17little difference between women and men in the wage growth experienced since the starting date.
21  An 
interesting result is that worker and firm characteristics matter for female wage growth but not male wage 
growth.  Focusing on results that achieve statistical significant at the ten percent level, female wage 
growth is negatively associated with both tenure and the percentage of employees covered by a collective 
bargaining agreement, and positively associated with Hispanic or other non-white status (relative to 
whites), job-specific performance, and number of sites of operation.  Of these factors, only tenure has a 
statistically significant association (positive in sign) with male wage growth.
22  
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 display regression results for the dependent variable “within-job wage 
growth without a promotion.”  The Oaxaca decompositions in the last row of the table indicate that when 
male weights are used the difference favors women whereas when the female weights are used the 
difference favors men.  These relatively small differences on the order of one percentage point parallel the 
unconditional results from Table 2, which revealed essentially no gender difference in within-job wage 
growth.  While the conditional results in columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 also suggest no substantial gender 
difference, recall that they may underestimate the gap favoring men, since, as explained above, the 
dependent variable is based on a question about the highest wage that any employee in this position 
[meaning the starting position of the most recent hire] could expect to attain without a promotion.  The 
results in columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 should therefore be interpreted with caution.   
Table 6 displays the regression results for the dependent variable “expected wage growth attached 
to expected promotions” that we estimate only on the subsample of workers for whom a promotion is 
expected.
23  Columns 2 and 4 are the same as columns 1 and 3, respectively, except for the inclusion of a 
dummy indicating whether a promotion has already been received.  The main result is that when the 
promotion dummy is excluded from the regression, we find a small difference favoring women when the 
male weights are used and a small difference favoring men when the female weights are used, though in 
both cases these differences are well below one percentage point.  When the regression controls for 
received promotions, the Oaxaca decompositions using either set of weights reveal differences favoring 
men (0.3 percentage points using male weights and 1.7 percentage points using female weights).  Relative 
to the mean wage change attached to expected promotions, which is 25 percent, these gender differences 
range from a 0.5 percent change favoring women (when the promotion dummy is excluded and male 
                                                 
21 As noted above, wage levels, as opposed to wage growth, are higher for men than for women, although not always 
significantly so. 
22 Another approach for investigating gender differences in the wage growth attached to promotion is to focus only on the 
subsample of promoted workers.  Though the sample size is small (N = 149), a regression of wage growth on a gender dummy 
and the full set of controls for the sample of promoted workers yields an estimated coefficient of  
-0.044 on the Male dummy, with a standard error of (0.044). 
23 We could not take an analogous approach for received promotions (that is, estimating a model of the wage increase in the 
subsample of promoted workers) since the subsample of received promotions is too small. 
18weights are used) to a 6.7 percent change favoring men (controlling for received promotions and using 
female weights).  The midpoint of this range is near the unconditional difference in means of 2.9 
percentage points found in Table 2.  An interesting point is that establishment size is statistically 
significant in these regressions but in none of our earlier models.  Given that most labor market outcomes 
vary by size it is interesting that the probabilities of promotion and expected promotion, as well as wage 
growth since entering the firm, and within-job wage growth without a promotion appear not to be 
associated with establishment size.  For both men and women, establishment size is negatively associated 
with the expected wage growth attached to expected promotions.   
To summarize the wage analysis, our main finding is that promotions yield roughly similar wage 
increases for men and women.  We interpret this as descriptively showing that the returns (in terms of 
higher wages) to promotion are the same or similar for women versus men.  A causal interpretation cannot 
be attached to the promotion coefficient, since, as discussed above, a selection effect might be operating 
whereby unobserved characteristics (for example, unobserved components of worker ability) determine 
both promotions and the wage increases attached to expected promotions.  The selection bias is likely to 
cause us to understate the extent to which wage increases attached to promotion are higher for men than 
women.  For example, if discrimination against women means that men are promoted farther down in the 
skill distribution than women, then promoted women are of higher average quality than promoted men.  
Thus, our finding of no observed gender difference in wage returns from promotion would actually imply 
a lower return for women than men of equal quality.  Similarly, we find little consistent evidence of 
gender differences in the expected wage change attached to expected promotions; our results suggest no 
meaningful difference if male weights are used and a modest difference favoring men if female weights 
are used.   
The fact that the wage growth accompany promotion is not smaller for women than men is not 
consistent with the “sticky floors” model proposed by Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2003) and tested 
using data from the British Household Panel Survey.  Whereas they found roughly the same promotion 
rates for men and women but lower wage increases from promotion for women, we find that women are 
promoted less frequently than men but that the wage increases attached to promotion are roughly 
comparable for both sexes (as did Olson and Becker 1983 and McCue 1996).  
 
A Test of the Consistency of the Observed Gender Differences With Employer Discrimination 
  To address taste-based models of gender discrimination we now turn our attention to the gender of 
the most recent hire’s immediate supervisor in the starting position, recalling that Male Supervisor is a 
dummy variable equaling one if the most recently hired worker’s immediate supervisor in the starting 
19position was male, and zero otherwise.  There is a large gender difference in the likelihood of having a 
male supervisor.  Seventy-eight percent of recently-hired men have a male supervisor versus only forty-
one percent of women.
24  This large, unconditional gender difference in the likelihood of having a male 
supervisor likely reflects underlying differences in representation of women across sectors. 
Table 7 displays the results from incorporating supervisor’s gender into our models of promotion, 
expected promotion, and wage growth.  In each case we present results from our most fully specified 
model, including, in addition to the baseline controls, performance measures, occupational dummies and 
firm characteristics.  In the models for the probabilities of promotion and expected promotion, taste-based 
discrimination (whereby male supervisors tend to underpromote women relative to men) would imply a 
negative coefficient on Male Supervisor, and a positive coefficient on the interaction of Male and Male 
Supervisor.  The results do not support this; whether the dependent variable is received promotions or 
expected promotions, the coefficients of interest frequently have the wrong sign and in all cases are far 
from statistically significant at conventional levels.  In the lower panel of Table 7 we report the 
coefficients on Male Supervisor in the various wage growth models, which are estimated separately for 
men and women.  In each model, the coefficient on Male Supervisor is statistically insignificant, casting 
doubt on the notion of gender discrimination based on male supervisor prejudice, although an alternative 
interpretation is that female supervisors also discriminate against their female subordinates in determining 
promotions and wages.   
Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard (2005) discuss an interpretation of these coefficients in the context 
of the theory of social roles (Eagly 1987).  Social role theory argues that certain social roles (which 
generally coincide with social status norms) are expected of individuals by society based on the particular 
groups to which they belong.  When workplace relationships deviate from the expected social roles (for 
example, when a female supervises a male), both supervisors and workers can become uncomfortable 
(Kanter 1977, Eagly 1987, as cited in Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard 2005).
25  Though in the present 
context the relevant “role breaking” relationship would be a female supervising a male, Giuliano, Levine 
                                                 
24 Using data from the NLSY for workers aged 17 to 25, Rothstein (1997) found that in 1982 the fraction of men with a male 
supervisor was 0.91 and the fraction of women with a male supervisor was 0.53.  The decline for both women and men in the 
likelihood of having a male supervisor is consistent with the increasing participation rate for women during the 1980s.  Future 
users of this variable in the MCSUI employer survey obtained from the ICPSR data archive should make note of a labeling 
error in the raw data.  The variable containing the supervisor’s gender is called “c35” in the codebook and equals 1 if the 
supervisor is female and 5 if male.  The text labels attached to these observations are reversed, however, with “male” being 
assigned to females and “female” assigned to males.  To avoid an error, the text labels should be ignored and only the 
underlying numerical codes (1 = female, 5 = male) should be used.  We are grateful to Harry Holzer for his help in identifying 
this problem. 
25 As noted in Reskin and Bielby 2005 (p. 78), “Qualitative research suggests the possibility that men in predominantly female 
jobs advance more quickly than their female co-workers because their supervisors are uncomfortable with men doing 
customarily female jobs (Williams, 1992).  However, the advancement gap between the sexes stems in part from sex 
composition of jobs, according to quantitative analyses showing that men in predominantly female jobs are promoted more 
slowly than their counterparts in mixed-sex or predominantly male jobs (Budig, 2002).” 
20and Leonard 2005 consider other possible role breaking relationships, such as young supervisors of older 
workers or non-white supervisors of white workers.   
The discomfort experienced by both parties to a role breaking relationship can lead to two 
different types of outcomes.  On the one hand, given that males belong to traditionally higher-status 
groups, a male worker supervised by a female is more likely to resent and disrespect the female manager 
than he would a male manager, and this might result in less desirable outcomes for the male worker (e.g. 
lower rates of promotion or expected promotion, or lower wage growth attached to promotions).  In the 
context of our estimated models, this would imply that the sum of the Male Supervisor coefficient and the 
Male × Male Supervisor coefficient was negative (so that male workers fare worse under a female 
supervisor than under a male supervisor).  On the other hand, traditionally lower-status workers who find 
themselves in supervisory roles might defer to traditionally higher-status workers, refraining from 
exercising authority over them.  This might lead to better outcomes for males supervised by females (such 
as higher rates of promotion or expected promotion, and higher wage increases attached to promotion).  In 
the context of our estimated models, this would imply that the sum of the coefficients on Male and Male × 
Male Supervisor is positive (so that male workers fare better under a female supervisor than under a male 
supervisor).  Since either or both of these possibilities could be present in the data and the reactions to role 
breaking relationships could differ across establishments, social role theory does not offer a clear 
prediction on the signs of our coefficients in Table 7.    
A potential concern discussed above is that a discriminating employer might give female workers 
lower performance ratings than similar male workers would receive.  This could mask gender 
discrimination in promotions because men and women with equal performance reported by the supervisor 
received the same treatment (with respect to promotion and wages), while in fact women would have to 
be more productive than men to receive the same performance rating.  To investigate this possibility, we 
checked for a relationship between the subjective performance rating and the gender of the immediate 
supervisor.  If discrimination in performance evaluations were widespread in our sample, we would 
expect to see that women with male supervisors would have lower scores, on average, than women with 
female supervisors.  In fact this is not the case.
26  However, we note that, as mentioned earlier, this result 
does not preclude the possibility of gender discrimination on the part of both male and female supervisors, 
                                                 
26 A regression of the performance rating on Male, Male supervisor, and Male × Male supervisor (as well as the controls for 
worker characteristics, occupation, industry, and firm characteristics) yields a Male coefficient of -0.007 (t = 0.45), a Male 
supervisor coefficient of 0.009 (t = 0.64), and a Male × Male supervisor coefficient of -0.001 (t = 0.04).  Since these estimates 
are far from statistically significant, this provides some evidence that the performance rating likely means the same thing for 
women as for men, at least under the assumption that male supervisors potentially discriminate against women and female 
supervisors do not.  
  
21or arising from the prejudices of customers or co-workers (as opposed to supervisors), or due to statistical 
discrimination.   
Using data from a large U.S. retail employer, the recent study by Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard 
(2005) found that when the worker and immediate supervisor are opposite genders, the promotion rate for 
workers is 8 to 11 percent lower.  Female managers promoted employees at a higher rate than male 
managers and, as mentioned, no overall gender difference in promotion rates was found in that firm.  In 
contrast, in our analysis having a male supervisor does not have a statistically significant effect on 
promotion rates.  While we are measuring an average effect across many firms, it is certainly possible that 
within a particular firm (as found by Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard) gender discordances in worker-
supervisor pairs are associated with lower rates of promotion. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
To conclude, it is useful to compare our main findings to those of the existing literature.  We 
restrict our attention to the relatively few studies that have considered both promotions and the wage 
changes attached to these promotions.  Our main finding is that rates of promotion are higher for men than 
for women, adjusting for included variables.  The magnitude of this effect ranges from 2.2 to 3.1 
percentage points (relative to a mean promotion rate of about 9.0 percent) across different specifications.  
It is reduced slightly (but not statistically significantly) by the presence of occupation controls, or industry 
and firm characteristics, or both occupation and firm/industry simultaneously.  We also find relatively 
little gender difference in wage changes with or without promotions, or perhaps a slight edge to men.  Our 
overall conclusion therefore matches Olson and Becker (1983) and McCue (1996), both of which found 
lower promotion rates for women than for men, but wage increases attached to promotions that were 
comparable for the two groups.  Our results on promotion probabilities also match the findings of Cobb-
Clark (2001), although that study found a wage change favoring women whereas we found relatively little 
gender difference in wage growth.  Our findings on promotion probability contradict those of Gerhart and 
Milkovich (1989) and Hersch and Viscusi (1996), since both of those studies found higher promotion 
rates for women.  Gerhart and Milkovich (like us) found comparable wage increases attached to 
promotions, while Hersch and Viscusi found a difference favoring men.    
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26Table 1: Variable Definitions 
 
Group  Name  Definition and comments 
Tenure  Length of time worker has been with firm, measured in 
weeks in the survey and converted to years 
Tenure squared   
Age  Age as of the survey date and measured in years 
Age squared   
Black  Dummy equaling one if worker is black 
Hispanic  Dummy equaling one if worker is Hispanic 
Other non-white  Dummy equaling one if worker is neither black, white, 
nor Hispanic 
Less than high 
school* 
 
High school  Dummy equaling one if highest education level is a high 
school degree (omitted category) 
More than high 
school 
Dummy equaling one if worker has more than HS degree 
but less than a college degree 
Baseline Controls
 
College degree or 
more 
Dummy equaling one if worker has a college degree or 
more 
Job-Specific 
Worker 
Performance 
Ratings
Performance of most 
recent hire in starting 
job 
“On a scale of 0-100 where 50 is average and 100 is the 
best score, how would you rate this employee’s 
performance in this job?”  (the job into which the worker 
was hired) 
27 
Group  Name  Definition and comments 
1.  Managerial  Includes Executive, Administrative, and 
managerial Occupations 
2.  Scientists, Engineers, 
Doctors, Lawyers 
Includes, Engineers, Surveyors and Architects; 
Natural Scientists and Mathematicians; Social 
Scientists, Religious Workers, Lawyers; Health 
Diagnosing and Treating Practitioners 
3.  Teachers, Librarians, 
Counselors 
Also includes Writers, Artists, Entertainers, and 
Athletes 
4.  RNs, Pharmacists, 
and Dieticians 
Also includes Therapists and Physicians’ 
Assistants 
5.  Technologists and 
Technicians 
Both “Health” and “Non-health” 
6.  Marketing and Sales 
Occupations 
Includes Executive, Administrative, and 
managerial Occupations 
7.  Administrative 
Support Occupations, 
including Clerical 
(omitted category) 
8.  Service Occupations   
9.  Craft, Construction, 
and Transportation 
Occupations 
Includes Mechanics and Repairers; Construction 
and Extractive Occupations; Precision Production 
Occupations; Transportation and Material Moving 
Occupations 
Occupation Controls 
(10): 
10.  Production Workers 
and Laborers 
Includes Handlers, Equipment Cleaners, Helpers 
and Laborers 
For-profit:  Dummy equaling one if establishment is for-profit 
Franchise:  Dummy equaling one if establishment is a 
franchise 
Number of sites  Number of sites of operation for the firm 
Establishment size   
Union:  Percentage of workers at establishment covered by 
collective bargaining agreement 
Firm Characteristics 
(including Industry 
Controls):
Industry controls (8): 
Services, manufacturing (omitted category), retail 
trade, wholesale trade, finance, transportation, 
construction and mining, public administration 
 
*This category includes 35 workers who completed only the eighth grade, 160 who attended some high school and 8 who 
completed a GED. 
28Table 2: Weighted Means and Standard Errors 
 
  Male Female  Difference 
Dependent Variables      
0.106 0.076  0.030*  Promotion since hired 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.017) 
0.688 0.631  0.057* 
Expected promotion in next 5 years 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.033) 
0.049 0.041 0.009 
Wage growth since entering establishment
1
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
0.296 0.295 0.002 
Within-job wage growth without promotion
1
(0.016) (0.014) (0.021) 
0.266 0.237 0.029  Expected wage growth attached to  expected 
promotions
2
(0.023) (0.021) (0.031) 
Worker Characteristics     
Tenure (in weeks)  6.494 
(0.553) 
6.847 
(0.485) 
-0.353 
(0.735) 
Age  31.0 
(0.435) 
30.7 
(0.398) 
0.252 
(0.590) 
White  0.590 
(0.026) 
0.688 
(0.020) 
-0.098** 
(0.033) 
Black  0.169 
(0.017) 
0.151 
(0.014) 
0.018 
(0.022) 
Hispanic  0.163 
(0.020) 
0.112 
(0.013) 
0.051** 
(0.024) 
Other non-white  0.078 
(0.013) 
0.049 
(0.010) 
0.029* 
(0.016) 
Performance of most recent hire in starting job (0-100)  78.123 
(0.838) 
79.888 
(0.612) 
-1.765* 
(1.037) 
Performance of typical worker in that job (0-100)  74.833 
(0.789) 
77.404 
(0.556) 
-2.571** 
(0.965) 
Less than a high school degree  0.065 
(0.008) 
0.037 
(0.007) 
0.028** 
(0.011) 
High school degree  0.385 
(0.024) 
0.336 
(0.020) 
0.049 
(0.031) 
More than a high school degree  0.252 
(0.019) 
0.316 
(0.022) 
-0.064** 
(0.029) 
College degree or more  0.298 
(0.032) 
0.312 
(0.027) 
-0.013 
(0.041) 
Occupations 
 
   
Managerial  0.094 
(0.021) 
0.132 
(0.023) 
-0.038 
(0.031) 
Scientists, Engineers, Doctors, Lawyers  0.082 
(0.028) 
0.023 
(0.007) 
0.059** 
(0.028) 
Teachers, Librarians, Counselors  0.033 
(0.009) 
0.110 
(0.023) 
-0.077** 
(0.024) 
RNs, Pharmacists, and Dieticians  0.013 
(0.011) 
0.022 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
Technologists and Technicians  0.042 
(0.008) 
0.037 
(0.010) 
0.005 
(0.012) 
Marketing and Sales Occupations  0.156 
(0.017) 
0.131 
(0.012) 
0.025 
(0.021) 
29  Male Female  Difference 
Administrative Support Occupations, Including Clerical 0.135 
(0.017) 
0.398 
(0.022) 
-0.264** 
(0.028) 
Service Occupations  0.109 
(0.012) 
0.085 
(0.011) 
0.024 
(0.017) 
Craft, Construction, and Transportation Occupations  0.189 
(0.017) 
0.029 
(0.006) 
0.159** 
(0.018) 
Production Workers and Laborers  0.147 
(0.013) 
0.032 
(0.007) 
0.115** 
(0.015) 
Firm Characteristics 
 
   
For-profit status  0.869 
(0.020) 
0.737 
(0.024) 
0.132** 
(0.031) 
Franchise  0.068 
(0.010) 
0.074 
(0.013) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
Number of sites  68.778 
(17.099) 
66.122 
(11.585) 
2.656 
(20.647) 
1175.282 253.120  922.142 
Establishment size 
(924.607) (26.123) (924.683) 
17.052 14.501  2.551 
Union (% covered) 
(2.191) (2.033) (2.988) 
Industries 
0.030 0.012  0.019**  Mining and Construction 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.008) 
0.271 0.137  0.134**  Manufacturing 
(0.020) (0.014) (0.025) 
0.058 0.044 0.014  Transportation 
(0.012) (0.011) (0.017) 
0.107 0.072 0.035  Wholesale Trade 
(0.020) (0.014) (0.025) 
0.179 0.148 0.031  Retail Trade 
(0.019) (0.016) (0.025) 
0.036 0.089  -0.053** 
Finance 
(0.007) (0.011) (0.014) 
0.298 0.485  -0.187**  Services 
(0.028) (0.024) (0.037) 
0.016 0.012 0.004 
Public Administration 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) 
Number of Observations  820 887   
Notes:  Statistical significance of the difference in means between males and females is denoted by * for the 
10% level and ** for the 5% level. 
1Calculated on the subsample for which wage change data are available (N = 628 for men, N = 654 for women)  
as in the analysis of Table 3,  columns 1 and 3. 
2Calculated on the subsample for which a promotion is expected and wage data are available  
(N = 405 for men, N = 400 for women) as in the analysis of Table 4. 
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Table 3: Probability of Promotion 
 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
Male  0.028 
(2.21)** 
0.031 
(2.47)** 
0.025 
(1.80)* 
0.025 
(2.25)** 
0.022 
(1.75)* 
Black  0.044 
(1.78)* 
0.044 
(1.84)* 
0.042 
(1.88)* 
0.048 
(2.09)** 
0.046 
(2.13)** 
Hispanic  0.015 
(0.74) 
0.019 
(0.95) 
0.019 
(0.95) 
0.028 
(1.36) 
0.028 
(1.40) 
Other non-white  0.098 
(1.75)* 
0.090 
(1.76)* 
0.087 
(1.91)* 
0.078 
(1.88)* 
0.077 
(2.02)** 
Age  -0.230 
(0.59) 
-0.239 
(0.67) 
-0.319 
(0.93) 
-0.174 
(0.55) 
-0.222 
(0.71) 
Age squared  0.347 
(0.65) 
0.337 
(0.70) 
0.415 
(0.90) 
0.274 
(0.63) 
0.306 
(0.72) 
Tenure  0.357 
(6.75)** 
0.332 
(6.64)** 
0.322 
(6.72)** 
0.287 
(6.24)** 
0.284 
(6.32)** 
Tenure squared  -0.126 
(4.16)** 
-0.118 
(4.10)** 
-0.113 
(3.99) 
-0.102 
(4.01)** 
-0.099 
(3.94)** 
Less than a high school degree  -0.041 
(2.84)** 
-0.039 
(2.99)** 
-0.040 
(3.35)** 
-0.034 
(3.11)** 
-0.036 
(3.39)** 
More than a high school degree  0.004 
(0.26) 
0.001 
(0.10) 
0.002 
(0.13) 
0.001 
(0.11) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
College degree or more  -0.063 
(4.55)** 
-0.064 
(5.05)** 
-0.065 
(4.44)** 
-0.058 
(4.70)** 
-0.060 
(4.31)** 
Performance of most recent hire 
in starting job (divided by 100)  •   
0.208 
(4.43)** 
0.210 
(4.65)** 
0.191 
(4.38)** 
0.195 
(4.61)** 
Performance of typical worker in 
that job (divided by 100)  •   
-0.061 
(1.41) 
-0.061 
(1.47) 
-0.050 
(1.28) 
-0.055 
(1.45) 
Firm Characteristics 
For-profit status  •    •    •   
0.037 
(3.41)** 
0.036 
(3.16)** 
Franchise  •    •    •   
0.006 
(0.27) 
0.005 
(0.21) 
Number of sites (divided by 
1000)  •    •    •   
0.004 
(0.42) 
0.003 
(0.32) 
Establishment size (divided by 
1000)  •    •    •   
-0.006 
(1.13) 
-0.005 
(0.88) 
Union (divided by 100)  •    •    •   
-0.031 
(1.78)* 
-0.033 
(1.93)* 
 
Occupation Controls  •    •    10  •    10 
Industry Controls  •    •    •    8 8 
Number of Observations  1826 
Note:  Entries are probability derivatives evaluated at the means of all variables for continuous variables.  For discrete independent variables, cell entries 
measure the change in predicted probabilities when the dummy independent variable increases from 0 to 1.  Z-statistics are in parentheses.  * and ** denote 
statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
31Table 4: Probability of Expected Promotion  
            Panel A  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) 
Male 
0.054 
(1.67)* 
0.053 
(1.69)* 
0.039 
(1.12) 
0.032 
(1.05) 
0.033 
(0.99) 
Promoted already  •    •    •    •    •   
 
               Panel B 
Male 
       0.045 
      (1.39) 
       0.044 
      (1.39) 
      0.034 
      (0.98) 
0.023 
(0.76) 
0.028 
(0.84) 
Promoted already 
       0.288 
     (9.48)** 
       0.279 
      (8.80)** 
      0.274 
     (8.38)** 
0.258 
   (8.58)** 
0.254 
   (8.43)** 
 
Occupation Controls  •    •    10  •    10 
Industry Controls  •    •    •    8 8 
Number of Observations  1711 
Note:  Both probits contain the same configurations of control variables as in Table 2.  Cell entries are probability derivatives evaluated  
at the means of all variables for continuous variables.  For discrete independent variables, cell entries measure the change in predicted  
probabilities when the dummy independent variable increases from 0 to 1.  Z-statistics are in parentheses.  * and ** denote statistical 
significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
 
32 
Table 5: Wage Changes From Promotions and Within-Job Wage Growth Without Promotions 
  Males Females 
  Wage Growth  Within-Job Wage 
Growth  Wage Growth  Within-Job Wage 
Growth 
Worker Characteristics 
0.094* 0.027  0.181**  -0.036 
Tenure (in years) 
(1.92)  (0.30) (2.52) (0.39) 
-0.016 -0.002  -0.143**  -0.023 
Tenure
2
(0.42)  (0.04) (4.51) (0.45) 
0.484 1.036  0.750*  -0.223 
Age (divided by 100) 
(1.30)  (1.40) (1.79) (0.30) 
-0.577 -1.582  -0.916  0.229 
Age
2
(1.12)  (1.64) (1.58) (0.23) 
0.016 0.028  0.009  -0.034 
Black 
(0.90)  (0.74) (0.61) (1.41) 
Hispanic  0.007 
(0.50) 
-0.027 
(0.95) 
0.042** 
(2.65) 
0.042 
(1.60) 
Other non-white  -0.034 
(1.46) 
-0.023 
(0.50) 
0.057** 
(2.13) 
-0.003 
(0.08) 
Performance of most recent 
hire in starting job (divided 
by 100) 
0.054  
(1.35) 
-0.428** 
(4.08) 
0.115** 
(3.61) 
0.069 
(1.18) 
Performance of typical 
worker in that job (divided 
by 100) 
-0.041 
(0.87) 
0.121 
(1.03) 
0.009 
(0.20) 
-0.191** 
(2.21) 
Less than high school 
degree 
0.009 
(0.48) 
0.010 
(0.26) 
-0.009 
(0.45) 
-0.036 
(0.72) 
More than high school 
degree 
-0.008 
(0.50) 
-0.015 
(0.42) 
0.007 
(0.55) 
0.008 
(0.40) 
College degree or more  0.006 
(0.25) 
-0.022 
(0.52) 
-0.029 
(1.45) 
-0.019 
(0.61) 
Promoted already  0.083** 
(2.80)  •   
0.068** 
(2.45)  •   
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  Males Females 
  Wage Growth  Within-Job Wage 
Growth  Wage Growth  Within-Job Wage 
Growth 
Firm Characteristics 
0.010 0.035  -0.006  0.037 
For-profit status 
(0.46)  (0.95) (0.30) (1.26) 
0.046  0.046 0.020 0.055 
Franchise 
(1.61)  (1.00) (0.84) (1.27) 
0.011 0.054  0.015*  0.008  Number of sites (divided by 
1000)  (1.29)  (1.29) (1.78) (0.60) 
0.002 -0.0005  0.007  0.012  Establishment size (divided 
by 1000)  (0.56)  (0.08) (0.72) (0.87) 
-0.011 -0.031  -0.028**  0.048 
Union (divided by 100) 
(0.81)  (1.02) (2.03) (0.93) 
10 10  Occupation Controls 
  
10 10 
8  8 8 8  Industry Controls 
     
Number of 
Observations 
628  628 654 654 
R
2 0.16  0.18 0.19 0.13 
Oaxaca Decomposition 
(measured in 
percentage points) 
-0.388 -1.355  0.681  3.074 
Note:  t-statistics are in parentheses.   * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.  
34Table 6: Expected Wage Growth Attached to Expected Promotions 
  Males Females 
  Expected Wage 
Growth 
Expected Wage 
Growth Controlling 
for Promotion 
Expected Wage 
Growth 
Expected Wage Growth 
Controlling for 
Promotion 
Worker Characteristics 
0.074 0.387**  -0.143  -0.082 
Tenure (in years) 
(0.45) (2.45)  (0.68)  (0.39) 
-0.355** -0.527**  0.133  0.133 
Tenure
2
(2.08) (3.15)  (0.77)  (0.78) 
1.192 1.234  1.530  1.636 
Age (divided by 100) 
(1.48) (1.62)  (1.44)  (1.55) 
-1.672 -1.688* -2.518*  -2.677* 
Age
2
(1.63) (1.74)  (1.71)  (1.83) 
-0.041 -0.046 -0.064*  -0.056* 
Black 
(1.10) (1.21)  (1.93)  (1.71) 
Hispanic  0.007 
(0.22) 
0.007 
(0.23) 
0.020 
(0.61) 
0.021 
(0.62) 
Other non-white  -0.156** 
(2.99) 
-0.136** 
(3.02) 
-0.038 
(0.75) 
-0.036 
(0.70) 
Performance of most recent hire in 
starting job (divided by 100) 
-0.125 
(0.94) 
-0.086 
(0.69) 
0.116 
(1.14) 
0.138 
(1.35) 
erformance of typical worker in that 
job (divided by 100) 
-0.179 
(1.47) 
-0.193 
(1.61) 
-0.115 
(0.54) 
-0.104 
(0.49) 
Less than high school degree  0.025 
(0.44) 
0.026 
(0.45) 
-0.093 
(1.33) 
-0.096 
(1.36) 
More than high school degree  -0.058* 
(1.71) 
-0.059* 
(1.81) 
-0.065** 
(2.07) 
-0.060* 
(1.95) 
College degree or more  -0.094** 
(2.12) 
-0.121** 
(3.10) 
0.028 
(0.41) 
0.023 
(0.33) 
Promotion received  •   
-0.194** 
(5.35)  •   
-0.113** 
(3.70) 
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  Males Females 
  Expected Wage 
Growth 
Expected Wage 
Growth Controlling 
for Promotion 
Expected Wage 
Growth 
Expected Wage Growth 
Controlling for 
Promotion 
Firm Characteristics 
0.009 0.011  -0.003  0.004 
For-profit status 
(0.22) (0.24)  (0.06)  (0.08) 
0.063 0.067 -0.097*  -0.100* 
Franchise 
(1.05) (1.13)  (1.69)  (1.76) 
0.008 0.010  -0.055**  -0.057** 
Number of sites (divided by 1000) 
(0.55) (0.64)  (2.59)  (2.65) 
-0.016** -0.018**  -0.043**  -0.043** 
Establishment size (divided by 1000) 
(2.03) (2.19)  (3.56)  (3.56) 
-0.020 -0.051  -0.007  -0.006 
Union (divided by 100) 
(0.54) (1.33)  (0.14)  (0.13) 
10 10  Occupation Controls 
  
10 10 
8 8  8  8  Industry Controls 
      
Number of Observations  405 405  400  400 
R
2 0.19 0.24  0.19  0.20 
Oaxaca Decomposition 
(measured in percentage 
points) 
-0.147 0.296  0.652  1.681 
Note:  t-statistics are in parentheses.   * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.   
36Table 7:  Effect of Supervisor Gender on Promotion Probabilities and Wage Growth 
  Probability of Promotion and Expected Promotion 
  Promotions Expected  Promotions Expected 
Promotions
*
Worker Characteristics 
Male   0.249 
 (1.25) 
-0.001 
(0.01) 
-0.015 
(0.09) 
Male Supervisor  0.095 
(0.61) 
0.044 
(0.36) 
0.047 
(0.38) 
Interaction of Male and Male Supervisor  -0.099 
(0.41) 
0.122 
(0.62) 
0.124 
(0.62) 
Number of Observations  1772  1667  1667 
  Males  Females 
Table 3, Within-job Wage Growth
 
0.037  
(1.08) 
N = 626 
-0.019  
(0.77) 
N = 661 
Table 4, Expected Wage Growth 
0.038 
(1.31) 
N = 395 
-0.017 
(0.48) 
N = 397 
Table 4, Expected Wage Growth 
Controlling for Promotion 
0.044  
(1.54) 
N = 395 
-0.021  
(0.59) 
N = 397 
Note:  Z and t statistics are in parentheses.  * and ** indicate significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively.  The first three rows of cell 
entries are probit coefficients of the three worker characteristic variables (Male, Male Supervisor, and the interaction of the two) on the 
probability of promotion or expected promotion.  The second three rows of cell entries are OLS slope coefficients of the variable Male 
Supervisor (the gender of the most recently hired worker’s supervisor in the starting position) on actual or expected wage growth when this 
variable is added to the most controlled specifications in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  The latter are done separately for both male and female workers, 
with the results appearing in separate columns. 
*This specification includes a dummy indicator for received promotions as a control variable. 
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Table A1: Weighted Means and Standard Errors (Wage Subsample) 
 
  Male Female  Difference 
Dependent Variables      
0.113 0.077  0.036*  Promotion since hired 
(0.017) (0.013)  (0.022) 
0.742 0.717  0.025  Expected promotion in next 5 years 
(0.026) (0.027)  (0.037) 
0.051 0.040  0.011  Wage change since entering establishment 
(0.007) (0.007)  (0.010) 
0.302 0.291  0.011  Within-job wage growth without promotion 
(0.017) (0.014)  (0.022) 
0.266 0.237  0.029  Expected wage growth attached to expected 
promotions
  (0.023) (0.021)  (0.031) 
Worker Characteristics      
Tenure  6.438 
(0.722) 
6.130 
(0.574) 
0.307 
(0.922) 
Age  30.7 
(0.497) 
30.2 
(0.475) 
0.551 
(0.688) 
White  0.552 
(0.031) 
0.656 
(0.025) 
-0.104** 
(0.040) 
Black  0.169 
(0.019) 
0.172 
(0.018) 
-0.004 
(0.026) 
Hispanic  0.196 
(0.026) 
0.109 
(0.015) 
0.087** 
(0.030) 
Other non-white  0.083 
(0.017) 
0.062 
(0.013) 
0.021 
(0.021) 
Performance of most recent hire in starting job (0-
100) 
77.914 
(0.924) 
78.830 
(0.729) 
-0.917 
(1.176) 
Performance of typical worker in that job (0-100)  74.412 
(0.964) 
76.229 
(0.582) 
-1.817 
(1.125) 
Less than a high school degree  0.066 
(0.010) 
0.035 
(0.007) 
0.031** 
(0.012) 
High school degree  0.434 
(0.030) 
0.331 
(0.023) 
0.103** 
(0.038) 
More than a high school degree  0.253 
(0.023) 
0.310 
(0.024) 
-0.057* 
(0.033) 
College degree or more  0.247 
(0.037) 
0.324 
(0.032) 
-0.076 
(0.049) 
Occupations 
 
    
Managerial  0.098 
(0.027) 
0.107 
(0.021) 
-0.009 
(0.034) 
Scientists, Engineers, Doctors, Lawyers  0.063 
(0.031) 
0.026 
(0.009) 
0.037 
(0.032) 
Teachers, Librarians, Counselors  0.036 
(0.011) 
0.115 
(0.029) 
-0.079** 
(0.031) 
RNs, Pharmacists, and Dieticians  0.017 
(0.015) 
0.026 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.017) 
Technologists and Technicians  0.048 
(0.010) 
0.041 
(0.014) 
0.007 
(0.017) 
38  Male Female  Difference 
Marketing and Sales Occupations  0.121 
(0.017) 
0.132 
(0.015) 
-0.011 
(0.023) 
Administrative Support Occupations, Including 
Clerical 
0.132 
(0.018) 
0.408 
(0.026) 
-0.276** 
(0.032) 
Service Occupations  0.121 
(0.016) 
0.078 
(0.012) 
0.043** 
(0.019) 
Craft, Construction, and Transportation Occupations  0.206 
(0.021) 
0.035 
(0.008) 
0.171** 
(0.022) 
Production Workers and Laborers  0.159 
(0.016) 
0.031 
(0.007) 
0.127** 
(0.018) 
Firm Characteristics 
 
    
For-profit status  0.849 
(0.027) 
0.737 
(0.030) 
0.112** 
(0.040) 
Franchise  0.065 
(0.012) 
0.069 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.016) 
Number of sites  77.219 
(23.860) 
65.045 
(14.928) 
12.175 
(28.133) 
289.505 301.387  -11.882 
Establishment size 
(85.314) (34.476)  (91.977) 
18.430 13.528  4.902 
Union (% covered) 
(2.750) (2.422)  (3.662) 
Industries 
0.024 0.016  0.008  Mining and Construction 
(0.006) (0.005)  (0.008) 
0.313 0.150  0.163**  Manufacturing 
(0.026) (0.016)  (0.031) 
0.045 0.043  0.002  Transportation 
(0.010) (0.010)  (0.014) 
0.085 0.057  0.028  Wholesale Trade 
(0.015) (0.013)  (0.020) 
0.170 0.138  0.032  Retail Trade 
(0.020) (0.015)  (0.025) 
0.037 0.097  -0.061** 
Finance 
(0.008) (0.013)  (0.015) 
0.301 0.497  -0.196**  Services 
(0.035) (0.029)  (0.045) 
0.020 0.013  0.005 
Public Administration 
(0.009) (0.005)  (0.009) 
Number of Observations  628 654   
Note:  Statistical significance of the difference in means between males and females is denoted by * for the 
10% level and ** for the 5% level.  Means are computed on the subsamples from the analyses in Table 4, except  
for the variable “Expected Wage Growth Attached to Expected Promotions” (this one is calculated on the  
subsample for which a promotion is expected and wage data are available [N = 405 for men, N = 400 for women]  
as in the analysis of Table 5). 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Male  0.026 
(1.64) 
0.026 
(1.77)* 
0.021 
(1.21) 
0.024 
(1.80)* 
0.020 
(1.32) 
Black  0.026 
(0.97) 
0.027 
(1.05) 
0.024 
(1.02) 
0.032 
(1.26) 
0.027 
(1.21) 
Hispanic  0.006 
(0.29) 
0.009 
(0.45) 
0.011 
(0.50) 
0.016 
(0.77) 
0.015 
(0.75) 
Other non-white  0.101 
(1.52) 
0.094 
(1.57) 
0.092 
(1.73)* 
0.079 
(1.75)* 
0.081 
(1.87)* 
Age  -0.181 
(0.38) 
-0.180 
(0.43) 
-0.198 
(0.47) 
-0.197 
(0.51) 
-0.175 
(0.45) 
Age squared  0.317 
(0.48) 
0.278 
(0.49) 
0.291 
(0.52) 
0.321 
(0.61) 
0.281 
(0.53) 
Tenure  0.406 
(5.83)** 
0.370 
(5.70)** 
0.366 
(5.97)** 
0.323 
(5.45)** 
0.325 
(5.71)** 
Tenure squared  -0.141 
(3.61)** 
-0.126 
(3.56)** 
-0.122 
(3.60)** 
-0.111 
(3.36)** 
-0.109 
(3.42)** 
Less than a high school degree  -0.029 
(1.28) 
-0.025 
(1.23) 
-0.028 
(1.47) 
-0.023 
(1.27) 
-0.024 
(1.41) 
More than a high school degree  0.018 
(1.00) 
0.016 
(0.95) 
0.016 
(0.91) 
0.017 
(1.14) 
0.019 
(1.16) 
College degree or more  -0.060 
(3.53)** 
-0.061 
(4.09)** 
-0.060 
(3.29)** 
-0.057 
(4.13)** 
-0.057 
(3.58)** 
Performance of most recent hire in starting job 
(divided by 100)  •   
0.240 
(4.37)** 
0.245 
(4.57)** 
0.221 
(4.40)** 
0.231 
(4.69)** 
Performance of typical worker in that job 
(divided by 100)  •   
-0.091 
(1.70)* 
-0.090 
(1.69)* 
-0.083 
(1.67)* 
-0.087 
(1.76)* 
Firm Characteristics 
For-profit status  •    •    •   
0.029 
(2.09)** 
0.027 
(2.07)** 
Franchise  •    •    •   
-0.003 
(0.14) 
-0.005 
(0.24) 
Number of sites (divided by 1000)  •    •    •   
0.006 
(0.60) 
0.006 
(0.58) 
Establishment size (divided by 1000)  •    •    •   
-0.005 
(0.96) 
-0.004 
(0.71) 
Union (divided by 100)  •    •    •   
-0.048 
(2.43)** 
-0.049 
(2.49)** 
 
Occupation Controls  •    •    10  •    10 
Industry Controls  •    •    •    8 8 
Number of Observations  1282 
Note:  Entries are probability derivatives evaluated at the means of all variables for continuous variables.  For discrete independent variables, cell 
entries measure the change in predicted probabilities when the dummy independent variable increases from 0 to 1.  Z-statistics are in parentheses.  
* and ** denote statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.  This table differs from Table 2 only in that it is estimated using a 
smaller subsample (corresponding to our wage growth analyses in Table 4). 
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